Curo, Ergo Sum — I Care, Therefore I Am

Vladimir Nemet

Introduction: The Problem of Human Self-Determination

Human beings have always sought to understand themselves and discover the foundations of their own humanity. The question of how to experience oneself as someone rather than something has long occupied the human mind.

Yet the need for such self-determination has not always existed. In the premodern world, people did not have to search for their identity; it was largely predetermined by birth, tradition, religion, and the social order. It was only with the emergence of modernism that the drama of self-determination began, with René Descartes becoming one of its key founders. His famous proposition, Cogito, ergo sum – I think, therefore I am – opens up a space in which the I becomes its own starting point, its own witness, and its own justification.

Several centuries later, the philosopher Martin Heidegger, one of the important philosophical precursors of postmodernism, attempts to move beyond this metaphysics of the subject by shifting the question from thought to being and language. He famously states – Language is the house of Being.

Identity is thus determined by one’s being-in-the-world and is no longer self-sufficient.

However, despite the radical differences between Descartes and Heidegger, both remain caught in the same fundamental difficulty: they attempt to understand human existence without giving the Other the place that truly belongs to them.

It seems to me that this is precisely where one of the fundamental errors of Western philosophy has remained unrecognized. The Other appears either as a problem of knowledge or as part of our being-in-the-world, as though a human being could first become what they are and only afterward assume responsibility for the Other.

But what if this sequence is mistaken? What if human existence cannot be grounded either in self-consciousness or in an understanding of Being, but only in what takes place between myself and the Other?

This article begins with the premise that ethics is not an addition to human existence but one of its fundamental conditions. Caring for the Other is not merely something a person does after becoming who they are. It is a way of discovering their own worth and giving meaning to their existence.

Ethics comes first, as Emmanuel Levinas puts it.

René Descartes: I Think, Therefore I Am

Descartes’s philosophy begins with radical doubt about tradition and the search for something that can never be called into question. In his philosophy, thought becomes the foundation of certainty about one’s own existence. The human being is thus defined as a being who confirms their existence through thinking: Cogito, ergo sum — I think, therefore I am.

But is thinking truly the deepest foundation of human existence? Is it not possible that, while preoccupied with knowing oneself, a person simultaneously moves away from what gives their existence its deeper meaning?

I see a way out of the enclosure of self-reflection in the relationship with the Other, that is, in the ability to open oneself to the Other’s existence and take responsibility for their well-being. By care, I do not mean worry or anxiety, which often arise from excessive preoccupation with oneself, but an ethical orientation toward the Other.

I therefore propose a new way of understanding human existence in contrast to Descartes’s formulation:

Curo, ergo sum.

I care, therefore I am.

I do not exist merely because I can think about myself. I ethically affirm my existence through my capacity to care for the Other.

Martin Heidegger: Language Is the House of Being

Heidegger shifts the question of human existence from the realm of knowledge to the realm of Being. The human being is not merely a subject observing the world, but a being for whom its own Being is at issue. Human existence is determined by being-in-the-world and being-with-others, while the understanding of Being becomes the central question of philosophy.

Heidegger uses the concept of Sorge, or care, as a fundamental concept in his analysis of human existence. However, his ontological conception of care is not the same as ethical care for the well-being of the Other. The former describes a fundamental structure of human existence, whereas the latter denotes a relationship of responsibility toward another human being.

Heidegger’s famous formulation, Language is the house of Being, expresses the conviction that Being reveals itself and is preserved in language. But what if our relationship with Being is opened up not primarily through language, but through our capacity to respond to the existence of the Other? What if the meaning of human existence is not exhausted by the understanding of Being, but is realized through an ethical relationship with another human being?

I therefore propose the following formulation in place of Heidegger’s:

Care is the house of Being.

To care for the Other means recognizing their right to their own personhood, their difference, and a way of life that need not conform to our expectations. It means preserving their possibility of being different from us, even when they do not care in the way we would.

Care is the house of Being because human existence acquires its ethical meaning only when the Other ceases to be an extension of our own I and becomes someone for whom we can care.

Care as the Primary Definition of Personhood

The feeling of care for another is not something a person learns and acquires only later in life. It is a possibility inscribed in the very structure of human personality from birth. Care is neither learned through instruction nor derived from moral rules.

Support for this view can also be found in well-known studies conducted at Yale University as part of the so-called Baby Lab. In experiments involving puppet shows, researchers demonstrated that babies, at just a few months of age, can distinguish between characters who help others and those who hinder them. In one well-known experiment, babies more frequently chose a character who helped another climb a hill over one who tried to push the other character back down. These findings suggest that the ability to recognize prosocial behavior emerges very early, before the development of speech and an understanding of moral concepts.

Although forms of care develop through relationships with others, their foundations cannot be reduced to upbringing or the acquisition of social rules.

For all these reasons, I believe we can affirm Emmanuel Levinas’s idea that ethics truly is first philosophy.

Jacques Derrida: Justice Beyond Rules

Derrida is one of the most important representatives of postmodern thought. He developed deconstruction, a philosophical approach that questions established meanings, values, and beliefs. Deconstruction demonstrates that what we consider unquestionable often rests on hidden assumptions and contradictions. Almost any philosophical system, social norm, or moral rule can therefore be questioned anew.

However, Derrida argued that there is something that cannot be deconstructed: justice.

In his well-known essay Force of Law, he explains that laws can be changed, questioned, and deconstructed, but justice cannot be reduced to existing laws. No law, however carefully designed, guarantees that its application will always be just. Justice therefore remains a demand that transcends every existing rule and calls upon us to reconsider our relationship with the Other.

I understand justice as a form of ethics: as the ability to recognize the value of the Other and feel responsible for their well-being. While moral rules may change according to society and historical period, an ethical relationship with the Other cannot be exhausted by rules. It begins where the existence of another human being places an obligation upon us, independently of our interests, beliefs, and expectations.

Derrida shows us that laws can be deconstructed, but the demand for justice and ethics remains for all time.

Narcissism and Fantasies of Omnipotence

People can define their identity in different ways: through strength, knowledge, beauty, success, or social status. However, I believe that such definitions often serve as psychological defenses through which people attempt to compensate for insecurity about their own worth. Instead of experiencing their own goodness and their capacity to care for the Other, they seek to prove that they are stronger, smarter, more beautiful, or more successful than others.

Narcissism is one of the most prominent forms of this defense today. The narcissistic person attempts to affirm their own existence through a fantasy of omnipotence: their worth depends on how exceptional they are, how much they know, how much they can achieve, and how much others admire them.

Care, by contrast, offers a different foundation for personhood. A person does not have to be stronger, smarter, or more beautiful than others to experience their own worth. It is enough to recognize their capacity to care for the Other. Their identity is then no longer based on comparison with others, but on an ethical relationship with them.

In this sense, I believe that care is the deepest way of defining one’s own personhood. A person does not become worthy by being omnipotent, but by being capable of limiting their own power for the sake of the Other. I therefore understand psychological development not as a process through which a person becomes increasingly powerful, independent, or successful, but as a process of gradually relinquishing the need for omnipotence and discovering their own capacity for an ethical relationship.

However, this virtue of caring for the Other must be recognized. Otherwise, a person may abandon this feeling and define themselves through what remains available to them: fantasies of knowledge, strength, beauty, and other forms of superiority. A child may experience care for another, tenderness, and a desire to help or protect. But if their environment fails to recognize these feelings, does not value them, or even regards them as signs of weakness, the child may be unable to incorporate their own experience of goodness into their self-image.

An interesting psychological reversal then occurs. What could originally have served as the foundation of a sense of self-worth remains unrecognized. The person therefore begins to seek other foundations on which to build their identity: knowledge, strength, beauty, success, uniqueness, and power.

Narcissism, then, is not merely excessive self-love, but may also be the consequence of one’s own goodness remaining unrecognized.

Psychotherapy as the Restoration of the Capacity to Care

I understand psychotherapy as a process in which the client gradually relinquishes the conscious or unconscious fantasy of omnipotence. They abandon the narcissistic need to affirm their own worth through strength, knowledge, beauty, or power over others.

However, this cannot happen unless something else emerges to provide a new foundation in place of these fantasies. A person cannot simply be left without their psychological defenses without discovering another way to experience their own worth and organize their personality.

I believe this is where the fundamental task of psychotherapy lies: restoring the capacity to care as an alternative to the fantasy of omnipotence. The client gradually discovers that they do not have to be omnipotent to be worthy, nor exceptional to have the right to exist. Their worth is not grounded in what they can prove to themselves and others, but in their capacity to recognize and preserve the well-being of the Other.

But how can this feeling of care be restored in the first place? I believe this is possible only through an encounter with an analyst who genuinely cares for their client. A client cannot rediscover their own capacity to care unless they encounter it in a relationship with the Other. Only when they feel that the analyst cares about them as a person, rather than merely about their progress, symptoms, or therapeutic success, does the possibility emerge of re-establishing contact with their own capacity to care. 

Care cannot be taught; it can only be awakened through a relationship with an Other who cares. 

The analyst’s care for the client gradually transforms into the client’s capacity to care for the analyst.

Analyst care is fundamental

In this sense, I believe that the analyst’s care is a fundamental and irreplaceable factor in the psychotherapeutic process. This holds true regardless of the analyst’s theoretical orientation, method, or school of thought. Different therapies may employ different techniques and offer different interpretations. But if they genuinely help the client, I believe this effect ultimately stems from the experience of having someone who is truly interested in them and concerned about their well-being. The analyst need not necessarily be aware of their own capacity to care, and their theoretical framework may even overlook or misunderstand its importance. Nevertheless, their care can be expressed in the way they listen, respond, tolerate the client’s suffering, and remain present during the most difficult moments.

To care for a client means recognizing their right to their own personhood, their difference, and their development, even when their path diverges from the analyst’s expectations. Care is not the same as permissiveness or the desire to protect the client from all suffering.

From this perspective, psychotherapy is not primarily a process of acquiring new insights, but one in which the client gradually relinquishes the need for omnipotence because they discover a different foundation for their own worth. Instead of having to be strong, exceptional, or superior, they begin to feel that their worth can arise from their own capacity to care.

A person does not become human only when they no longer need anyone. They become more mature when they can acknowledge that the Other is not a part of them and yet can still matter to them. When they can care without needing to possess, love without needing to control, and recognize the value of the Other without demanding that this value be returned to them.

Psychotherapy, too, succeeds when the client no longer needs to be exceptional in order to feel worthy. And this becomes possible when, through their relationship with the analyst, they rediscover their capacity to care for the Other — and realize that it is precisely in this capacity to care that the foundation of their humanity lies.