Bipolar Disorder and the Failure of the Dialogical Self: A Theory of Parallel Identities
Vladimir Nemet
Abstract
This paper examines the concept of “You” as an innate structure that forms the foundation of dialogical subjectivity, yet cannot become functional without being realized through a relationship with an empathic Other. Through a clinical vignette and the theoretical framework of the theory of parallel identities, we explore how disturbances in the rhythm of alternation between the positions of “I” and “You” can lead to psychopathological states, particularly bipolar disorder. Special emphasis is placed on understanding why, in bipolar disorder, the alternation between these two positions occurs so slowly—unlike in psychologically mature individuals, where these shifts happen several times per second. We argue that this slowness serves a protective function: it allows the psyche to avoid the experience of fragmentation that would otherwise provoke overwhelming rage and a loss of the sense of self.
Introduction
The theory of parallel identities posits that the subject is not formed as a stable, fixed “I” but rather as a dynamic interchange between relational positions of “I” and “You.” When functional, this exchange enables affect regulation, mentalization, and the maintenance of a coherent sense of self. In healthy development, “You” is internalized as a stable and empathic interlocutor capable of supporting the subject in moments of vulnerability. However, disturbances in early emotional relationships may inhibit the development of a functional internal “You,” leading to rigid, irreconcilable identity oscillations (Kohut, 1977; Stolorow & Atwood, 1992).
This paper addresses two central questions:
- Why is the alternation between “I” and “You” so slow in bipolar disorder, even though it occurs rhythmically and almost continuously in psychologically integrated individuals?
- Why must the experience of “You”—although structurally present and innate—be realized and affirmed through empathic and caring relational experiences?
Through a clinical vignette and theoretical reflection, we will analyze how a disturbed rhythm of identity position exchange leads to self-fragmentation, and how the psyche uses slowness as a defense against intolerable affect that could result from abrupt and unintegrated shifts.
Clinical Vignette: Marko and the Dynamics of Parallel Identities in Bipolar Disorder
Marko is a 34-year-old man, educated but chronically destabilized in his professional and emotional functioning. His history includes frequent job loss, disrupted relationships, and impulsive decisions that reflect patterns characteristic of bipolar disorder. He grew up in an emotionally ambivalent environment: a father who was authoritarian and critical, and a mother who was withdrawn yet intrusively overprotective. From early childhood, Marko oscillated between withdrawal and sudden exuberance, the latter often ridiculed and dismissed as excessive.
During his manic episodes, Marko enters an almost ecstatic state: he feels omnipotent, beautiful, inspired, and infallible. He perceives himself as all-knowing and central to a world that revolves around him. But beneath this inflation lies the complete absence of the “You” position: the Other exists only as a passive audience to his grandiosity. Any criticism is experienced as a threat to his right to exist, evoking intense anger or withdrawal.
In depression, the picture shifts dramatically. Meaning disappears, confidence turns into self-loathing. “You” becomes an internal persecutor—a harsh and omnipresent critic. Marko feels like a moral and aesthetic failure, ugly and worthless. He loses interest in creative pursuits, isolates himself, and the fragmentation of self becomes almost palpable—he no longer knows who he is or how to find out.
Marko’s identity shifts are not fluid but abrupt, explosive, and exhausting. They represent more than mood swings: they signify ontological transitions—from one form of existence to another, mutually exclusive and incompatible.
Disturbance in the Rhythm of Alternation between “I” and “You”
Marko’s case reveals a deeper psychodynamic pathology—an impaired regulation of the rhythm between “I” and “You” positions. When this rhythm is not flexible and fluid, the subject becomes stuck in one identity, with the other suppressed or entirely excluded. Instead of the continuous micro-alternations between I and You—which in a healthy subject enable dialogue, empathy, and self-reflection—Marko experiences partial identifications with no transitional space.
In mania, the “I” identity fully occupies the psychic apparatus, excluding any form of reflectivity. In depression, the internal “You” becomes an omniscient judge, offering not dialogue but condemnation. Such rigidity in identity transitions leads to disintegration—that is, psychological fragmentation (Stolorow & Atwood, 1992).
Slowness as Protection Against Fragmentation
A crucial question emerges: why do these identity phase transitions occur so slowly in bipolar disorder—over days or weeks—while in healthy individuals they occur imperceptibly, multiple times per second? The answer lies not only in biochemistry but also in the defensive function of slowness itself.
Rapid shifts between contradictory identity positions, without the capacity to integrate them, would result in a collapse of reality perception, provoking unbearable rage—the archaic, primary rage that stems from losing internal continuity. Slowness here functions defensively: it gives the psyche time to restructure, for defense mechanisms to take hold, and for the subject to avoid disintegration under the pressure of contradiction.
In other words, slowness is not a sign of regression but a compromise aimed at preserving minimal integration—a survival strategy for a psyche where the simultaneous presence of “I” and “You” is intolerable. When rage does erupt, it signals an attempted but premature integration that remains psychologically unachievable.
The Genetic Potential of “You” and Its Realization through Relationship
The theory of parallel identities suggests that “You” is present from the beginning—as a potential, a structural possibility. From both neurobiological and phenomenological perspectives, the human being is inherently relational: the capacity for dialogue, empathy, and the perception of the Other is innate.
Yet without early experiences of emotional resonance and affirmation, this genetic potential remains unrealized. Instead of an empathic “You,” the child internalizes a “Other” as either an idealized or punitive figure. Marko’s internal “You” oscillates between these extremes: it can never exist in real time, in the function of a living relational presence.
Winnicott (1971) emphasizes the importance of the transitional space where the self develops through encounter with the Other. When such a space is absent—when the emotional environment is rigid, cold, or unreliable—the child has nowhere to “place” its “You.” It is either absorbed into idealization or transformed into a threat.
Conclusion: Psychoanalysis as a Space for the Experience of Fragmentation
Psychoanalytic therapy, especially within the framework of self psychology (Kohut, 1984), offers the possibility of repairing the disrupted rhythm between “I” and “You.” In a repeated, stable, and empathic relationship—where the analyst does not judge but resonates—”You” can be reborn as a stable function. This allows for softer, psychologically bearable alternations between identity positions without the need for rigid defenses against fragmentation.
But the ultimate aim of psychoanalysis is not to avoid fragmentation. On the contrary, its meaning lies in enabling the subject to endure, recognize, and affectively respond to the experience of disintegration, which is inseparable from every authentic change, every transition, and every encounter. Fragmentation is not a system failure, but the fundamental condition of growth.
When the subject can experience fragmentation without defending against it—and can maintain relationship with the Other within that collapse—then the space opens for genuine psychological maturation. In this sense, therapy does not offer identity stability, but rather the capacity for dialogue within instability.
References
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