Thought as Invocation of the Other
(A New Ontology of Thinking)
V. Nemet
Introduction
Western philosophy, especially since Descartes, grounds subjectivity in the capacity for thinking: Cogito ergo sum. I think, therefore I am.
But what if the reverse is true?
What if I do not think because I exist, but I exist because I invoke the Other through thought?
In reflecting on the nature of thought as invocation of the Other, my theory of parallel identities offers a particularly fruitful perspective. This theory describes the subject not as a unified, stable whole, but as a dynamic system of two simultaneous, layered, and often contradictory identities that alternate and coexist within a single psyche. These parallel identities exist in a constant dialogue with the Other—whether real or imagined—and it is precisely through this complex network of inner and outer relations that the subject gains coherence and fullness.
In this light, thinking cannot be viewed as an isolated monologue, but as a process in which each of these identities invokes its own echo of the Other.
Even when the Other is not present, it is this multidimensional dynamic within the subject that creates the space in which thought may exist as an invocation of presence—as a call for the Thou to be present in all its layers. (Buber, 1970)
This text proposes an alternative ontology of thinking:
Thought is not a monologue, nor even a dialogue, but an invocation – a gesture toward a missing Thou.
In other words:
I think that I might be heard – or more precisely, I think that someone might be.
I. Thought is Not an Inner Process
We experience thought as a stream of words, images, and reflections. Yet each of those words carries the trace of an addressee.
Even when we speak to ourselves, we speak as if someone is listening.
Freud noted that the superego is an inner observer that “listens” (Freud, 1923). Lacan called this observer the Big Other—the structured field of language within which speech acquires meaning (Lacan, 1977).
But here, we go one step further:
If the Other is not there, thought does not occur. If thought does occur, it is because we are invoking the Other – even if they are not yet here.
II. What is Invocation?
Invocation is not a demand, nor a prayer in the conventional sense.
It is not a religious act, but an ontological gesture.
A crying infant does not simply ask for a bottle – it calls for presence (Winnicott, 1965).
So too does thought:
When I think, I invoke the Thou – not because it is there, but because it is absent.
Here, thought is no longer grounded in presence, but in absence.
This marks a reversal from the rationalist tradition:
Instead of thought proving existence, thought opens the space for the possible presence of the Other.
III. Solitary Confinement, Autism, Silence
Consider a person in complete isolation – solitary confinement.
They do not stop thinking immediately. But their thoughts begin to lose structure, because there is no Other to confirm them (Sartre, 1957; Winnicott, 1965).
After some time, they begin to speak to themselves—not out of madness, but out of a need to retain the Other, even in traces.
In children with severe forms of autism, we often encounter thought without an addressee – fragmented, circular, closed in on itself (Tustin, 1981).
It is not deficient, but wounded: born without echo.
Thus we say:
Thought without the Other does not cease—but it folds in on itself and ceases to be a path.
IV. Consequence: A New Spiritual Ontology of Thought
If we accept this hypothesis, far-reaching possibilities emerge:
- Thought becomes a call, not a proof (Levinas, 1961).
- Thought is not the foundation of self-awareness, but of desire (Lacan, 1966).
- Thought is inherently dialogical—even when the Other is not yet there.
Here, the ontology of thinking fuses with the spiritual structure of invocation:
Thinking becomes an inner liturgy of presence—and perhaps, a new definition of the subject.
Conclusion
I do not think because I exist, nor because someone is listening.
I think because I want the Thou to exist.
And therefore:
Thought is not a mirror of the self, but the echo of the Other – even when all is silent.
References
Buber, M. (1970) I and Thou. Trans. Walter Kaufmann, New York.
Freud, S. (1923). The Ego and the Id. SE, 19: 12–66.
Lacan, J. (1977). Écrits: A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan. Norton.
Levinas, E. (1961). Totality and Infinity. Duquesne University Press.
Sartre, J.-P. (1957). Being and Nothingness. Washington Square Press.
Tustin, F. (1981). Autism and Childhood Psychosis. Routledge.
Winnicott, D. W. (1965). The Maturational Processes and the Facilitating Environment. International Universities Press.
