Heidegger, Anxiety, and Parallel Identities
Vladimir Nemet
Introduction
Anxiety occupies a central place in philosophy and psychology as a profound, foundational affect of human existence. In Being and Time (1927), Martin Heidegger describes anxiety (Angst) not as a mere feeling of discomfort, but as a fundamental affective tone through which the existential structure of the human being—Dasein, “being-there” in the world—reveals itself.
My theory of parallel identities expands this line of thought by introducing the concept of subjectivity as a dynamic interplay of I and Thou perspectives, rather than as a static, unified self. These rapid shifts between I and Thou perspectives inevitably generate brief moments of fragmentation, which can evoke anxiety while simultaneously enabling authentic growth and an expansion of consciousness.
This article explores how Heidegger’s phenomenological analysis of anxiety and my theory of parallel identities intersect in recognizing the inevitability of fragmentation as a condition for authenticity, while also clarifying their differences regarding the primary affect that accompanies these moments. Sloterdijk’s insights into anger as a primordial affect further illuminate how fragmentation may be experienced not as trauma, but as a vital impulse toward living fully.
Heidegger: Anxiety as a Path to Authenticity
Martin Heidegger centers his philosophy on the question of Being (Sein) and the human being’s relationship to its own existence. Dasein is not merely present in the world but is aware of its finitude and freedom, always open to the possibilities of the future. The core of Heidegger’s analysis is care (Sorge), the structural orientation of the subject toward itself, the world, and others.
In Being and Time, Heidegger distinguishes fear (Furcht), which is directed at a specific object, from anxiety (Angst), which lacks an object and is directed toward existence itself. In moments of anxiety, the world “empties” of its familiar meanings and certainties, leaving the subject exposed to the nothingness (das Nichts) and freedom of existence.
A critical component of this process is the deconstruction of das Man—the collective, inauthentic identity that guides everyday functioning behind the facade of “one says,” “one thinks,” “one does.” Anxiety dismantles these masks, exposing the subject to freedom and the responsibility for its existence while confronting the emptiness and instability of the world.
For Heidegger, anxiety is an inevitable and fundamental affect through which the subject opens a space for authentic existence, free from the illusions of safety provided by everyday routines.
Parallel Identities and the Affect of Anger
Theory of parallel identities posits that the subject is not a static entity but is formed through dynamic shifts between I and Thou perspectives. These transitions are non-linear and involve micro-oscillations, rapid movements that destabilize identity and fragment the self temporarily.
Each shift between I and Thou entails a brief period of fragmentation as the subject loses its familiar foothold in established identity structures. This fragmentation, as with Heidegger, is inevitable and often provokes anxiety due to the temporary loss of orientation.
However, while Heidegger regards anxiety as the fundamental affect accompanying fragmentation, I emphasize that the primary affect that arises in the face of deconstruction is not anxiety but anger. Anger emerges as a natural bodily and psychic response to identity fragmentation, preserving boundaries, vitality, and agency.
Anxiety, in this framework, appears only when anger is suppressed or forbidden, leaving the subject without the capacity to actively process fragmentation and instead paralyzed before the void. Thus, anxiety is secondary, while anger is the primary emotional response to the moment of fragmentation.
Edward Tronick’s Still Face experiment (1978) demonstrates that when contact with the mother is suddenly interrupted, “the infant’s first reaction is anger and frustration, actively attempting to restore the connection“. Only when these attempts receive no response does “anger withdraw and give way to anxiety, showing that anger is the primary affect while anxiety is a secondary reaction to relational fragmentation“.
My perspective offers optimism within postmodern fragmentation, presenting deconstruction not as an end but as an opportunity to enjoy vitality, resistance, and creative action through the acceptance of anger as a signal of life.
Sloterdijk: Anger as the Primordial Affect
In Rage and Time (Zorn und Zeit, 2006), Peter Sloterdijk argues that the fundamental human affect is not anxiety but anger (Zorn). Sloterdijk uses the concept of thymos to capture this primal energy that enables the subject to act, preserve boundaries, and express dissatisfaction within the world.
When identity fragments—whether through existential anxiety (Heidegger) or shifts between I and Thou (Nemet)—anger is the first affect to emerge, signaling the subject’s vitality and capacity for action even when facing the emptiness of existence.
When anger is unrecognized or socially repressed, it becomes transmuted into anxiety. Sloterdijk thus gives a practical dimension to the phenomenology of fragmentation: anxiety is not the inevitable fate of subjectivity but the result of social and internal suppression of anger.
Similarities and Differences: Heidegger and Nemet
Similarities
Heidegger and my theory share the fundamental insight that fragmentation of identity is an inevitable condition for authentic existence. For both, the encounter with emptiness and the deconstruction of familiar narratives is essential for the subject’s growth.
Differences
Their primary divergence lies in the interpretation of the affect that accompanies fragmentation:
- Heidegger views anxiety as the fundamental affect that dismantles illusions of safety and reveals the truth of existence, opening the way to authenticity.
- My theory assert that anger is the primordial affect in moments of fragmentation, with anxiety emerging only when anger is repressed. Anger enables the subject to actively engage with fragmentation, maintaining vitality and agency in the face of emptiness.
Sloterdijk aligns with my view, framing anger as thymos, the energetic response that allows the subject to pass through moments of fragmentation without paralysis.
The Psychoanalytic Dimension: The Goal Is Not to Escape Anxiety
Within a psychoanalytic context, the goal is not to remove or avoid anxiety, as doing so would mean avoiding life and the encounter with the Other. Instead, psychoanalytic work creates space for the individual to recognize and embrace anger as a sign of vitality and as the affect that enables movement through fragmentation.
When the individual learns to enjoy their anger as a sign of life, fragmentation no longer becomes a source of paralysis through anxiety but transforms into an opportunity for expansion, flexibility, and the capacity for authentic encounter with the Other.
In this way, fragmentation ceases to be a traumatic event and becomes a space of encounter with oneself and the world, where the subject retains the capacity for action and creation, rather than retreating into defensive structures or regression.
Conclusion
Identity fragmentation is an unavoidable aspect of human existence. Heidegger teaches us that anxiety reveals the emptiness of being, while my theory of parallel identities, supported by Sloterdijk, shows that anger is the primary reaction that preserves vitality and boundaries during fragmentation.
Anxiety arises only when anger is suppressed, and the task of psychoanalysis is not to help the individual flee from anxiety but to enable them to enjoy their anger as the affect that makes them unafraid of fragmentation and capable of using it as an opportunity for authentic growth and encounter with the Other.
Thus, the theory of parallel identities opens a path toward a new psychoanalytic paradigm where the aim is not stability of identity but the capacity to fluidly oscillate between I and Thou perspectives, using thymos as a vital bridge that transforms fragmentation into a process of life rather than a source of fear.
References
- Heidegger, M. (1927). Sein und Zeit. Niemeyer, Tübingen.
- Sloterdijk, P. (2006). Zorn und Zeit: Politisch-psychologischer Versuch. Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main.
- Nemet, V. (2025). Theory of Parallel Identities (unpublished manuscript).
- Tronick, E. Z., Als, H., Adamson, L., Wise, S., & Brazelton, T. B. (1978). The infant’s response to entrapment between contradictory messages in face-to-face interaction. Journal of the American Academy of Child Psychiatry,
